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16 April 1959

The following text, which comprises the main conclusions of a CIA/BIS working group on the situation in Iraq, was presented to the NSC in a briefing on 15 January 1959.

- I. Our present position on Iraqi situation can be summarized as follows:
 - A. While we have no evidence that Qasim is a Communist, it is clear that he is increasingly coming under Communist influence, and is likely soon to reach a point where he is incapable of action independent of the Communists.
 - B. Unless action is taken to curb Communism, or unless the Communists make a major tactical error, Iraq will probably be transformed into a Communist controlled state.
 - C. We do not consider that Nasir's conspiratorial apparatus in Iraq--at least for the time being--is sufficiently organized to enable him to initiate a successful coup from Cairo aimed at bringing Iraq into the UAR.
 - D. The only effective and organized force in Iraq capable of countering Communism is the Army. Our basic intelligence on the present situation of the Army is very weak.
 - E. There is a distinct possibility that a period of chaos might develop in the event of an unsuccessful coup attempt or a

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breakdown of administration. Should this happen, the ultimate advantage will lie with the Communists who demonstrated immediately after the Revolution a striking organizational and improvisational skill.